科学研究
报告题目：Public Enforcement through Independent Directors
报告人：岳衡
报告时间：2021年10月21日（周四）10:00
报告地点：劝学楼245
主办单位：bet365手机网址-bet365中文app
【报告摘要】
We examine whether and how public enforcement can constrain self-dealing activities in emerging markets. Using data from China, we find that firms receiving comment letters concerning related-party transactions (hereafter RPTs) from stock exchanges significantly reduce their RPTs in subsequent years. Independent directors play a significant role in effecting the comment letters’ governance role. We find that (1) independent directors are more likely to dissent or resign after their firms receive RPT comment letters, especially when they have higher career and reputational concerns, and (2) the subsequent reduction in RPTs is also more pronounced when independent directors have such higher concerns. Nonetheless, independent directors’ governance effectiveness is moderated by firms’ political connection, ownership concentration, and local legal environment. Overall, our results suggest that even in emerging markets in which the legal systems are generally weak, public enforcement can still constrain controlling shareholders’ expropriation activities through leveraging independent directors’ reputational incentives. Our study sheds light on a within-firm mechanism through which public enforcement takes effect.
【报告人简介】
岳衡，新加坡管理大学bet365手机网址 副教授(tenured)，MCFO项目主任，中国财政部全国会计领军人才。毕业于美国杜兰大学（Tulane University），曾任北京大学光华管理学院教授，博士生导师，会计系主任。在Journal of Financial Economics、Accounting Review、Contemporary Accounting Research、Review of Accounting Studies、Journal of International Business Studies、Journal of Banking and Finance、Journal of Corporate Finance、《管理世界》、《会计研究》等国际和国内权威学术刊物发表论文30余篇，获国家自然科学基金优秀青年基金，主持和参与多项国家自然科学基金项目。研究领域主要在中国资本市场、公司治理、盈余预测、企业投融资研究等。
